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. Loman
guilty plea to possession

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Timothy Arredondo was on patrol

encountered Loman,

he recognized from previous drug-related
, Officer Arredondo "conducted a
for Loman's arrest.

12-

Officer Arredondo decided to wait for Loman to leave a

which

there was an outstanding

Loman entered "for a short amount of time." (Tr., p.8, Ls.16-23.)

Loman

the residence, he "got into the passenger seat and another male
identified as Tex Mason got into

driver's seat." (Tr., p.8, Ls.23-2S.) Loman

and Mason "sat in the vehicle for quite a while with the vehicle running." (Tr., p.8,
- p.9, L.2.)
at his

Officer Arredondo watched Loman "messing with
and "[i]nstead of waiting for him

off, with the

" Officer Arredondo "decided to go ahead and stop
in the car." (Tr., p.9, Ls.2-7.)
Officer Arredondo pulled up behind Loman's vehicle,
overhead lights, and got out of

patrol car.

by "immediately jump[ing]" out

, p.9,

the car
"Arredondo

(Tr., p.9, Ls.23-2S.)
and ordered

on

1

p.10, LA.) Officer Arredondo told Loman there was a warrant for his arrest and
instructed him to put his hands behind his back. (Tr., p.10, Ls.3-4.) Rather than
comply with Officer Arredondo's instructions, Loman started taking off his coat.
(Tr., p.10, Ls.6-7.) Officer Arredondo told Loman to leave his coat on and again
told him to put his hands behind his back. (Tr., p.10, Ls.7-9.) Loman continued
to ignore Officer Arredondo, pulled away as Officer Arredondo reached for him,
"took his coat off real quick, threw it in the car and shut the door." (Tr., p.i0,
Ls.9-1i.) Officer Arredondo then placed Loman in handcuffs and "retrieved the
coat out of the vehicle." (Tr., p.1 0, l,23 - p.11,

1.) After Officer Arredondo

removed the coat from the car and "threw it down on the ground" while he
completed his pat down of Loman and requested a transport unit.

(Tr., p.11,

Ls.17-22.) Mason remained in the car as this was taking place. (Tr., p.11, Ls.2224.)
After arranging for Loman's transport and securing Mason, Officer
Arredondo searched Loman's coat and discovered "a flashlight containing
methamphetamine and a meth pipe" in the coat pocket. (Tr., p.12, Ls.6-14; p.21,
Ls.15-18.) Officer Arredondo then had his canine, Carlo, "do a free air sniff of the
vehicle." (Tr., p.13, l,25 - p.14, l,2.) Carlo "gave a positive indication when
presented the passenger-side door handle of the vehicle." (Tr., p.14, Ls.6-7.) A
further search of the car based on Carlo's alert revealed no additional drugs.
(Tr., p.14, Ls.18-21.)
The state charged Loman with possession of methamphetamine and
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.51-52.) The state also filed an Information

2

a

is a persistent violator.

nnrynnn

search of his coat and

a

rights. (R., pp.74-79.) The
which it denied his request for
Loman filed a motion
because, at the time of

was

confirmation of the outstanding
motion

substance, reserving his

one

(R.,

11

6.)

reconsider. (R., p.121.)

subsequently entered a conditional

1

(R.,

plea to possession

to appeal the denial of

a

motion

126-140.) The court imposed a unified six-year sentence with

fixed. (R., pp.158-161.) Loman filed a notice
of judgment. (R., pp.166-168.)

the plea agreement, the
(R., p.126.)

3

appeal

from the

ISSUE
Loman states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied
suppress?

Loman's

to

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Loman failed to establish the district court erred in denying
to suppress the evidence discovered pursuant to a search incident to
on a warrant?

4

motion
arrest

contends

in denying

search was an improper search
that

he

his

remove it, the search

motion to suppress,
to arrest.

in the

despite

his coat must satisfy one of the two
556 U.S.

(2009).

that because neither exception applies in
suppression was

(Appellant's

13-16.)

argument fails because the search of his coat was not conducted as part of an
automobile search

to arrest. Alternatively, Loman was not

to

suppression because the search was properly conducted pursuant to the
exception based upon the probable cause provided

standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
on a motion to suppress is challenged, we
fact that are supported by substantial evidence,
of constitutional principles to
41

,730,117

3d 142, 1

(Ct.

5

the trial court's
we

facts as found,"
2005).

The District Court Correctly Concluded Suppression Was Not Required
The

Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and

warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls
special and well-delineated exceptions to
.:....:o.:::..:..:..:::...L'

warrant requirement."

certain
State v .

134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v.

New Hampshire, 403 U.
479, 988 P.2d 700,

443, 454-55 (1971);

133 Idaho 474,

(Ct. App. 1999).) A search incident to arrest is a wellrequirement and, as such, does not violate
U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969);

134 Idaho at 874, 11 P .3d at 493.

With respect to searches of

automobiles conducted solely incident to an individual's arrest, the Supreme
Court in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), adopted the following legal
standard:

"Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest

only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence
"

of the offense of
Loman's coat

129 S.Ct. at 1723.

Although the search of

not satisfy either of the exceptions set forth in Gant, the

search of Loman's coat did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Gant
does not apply since the search

Loman's coat was not part of an automobile

search incident to arrest.
When Officer Arredondo first made contact with Loman, Loman was
outside his vehicle and wearing his coat. At that time, Officer Arredondo advised
Loman there was a warrant

his arrest and instructed him to put his hands

6

as he was instructed,
the coat on and put

request to

threw the coat inside the car
placed Loman
coat and

Loman's coat

facts

a search of his car pursuant to his arrest,
incident to his arrest.

as

forth in State v. Bowman, 134

P.2d 637 (Ct. App.

to

In Bowman, an

stopped

176,

search of Loman's
men believing one of them had an

outstanding arrest warrant. 134 Idaho

1

997 P.2d at 638. The men agreed

the individual whom the officer believed to be the subject
identified himself as Bowman. kL at 177-178,

of the outstanding
at 638-639. While

officer was running a warrants check, a woman

came out of an adjacent
P.2d at 639. After the

not

occurred as a search

therefore,

legal

997

it until after

but did

was arrested.

to talk to the officer

handcuffs

kLat178,

and approached

Bowman had a warrant for

learned

arrest,

"but prior to informing Bowman that he was under arrest," the officer "observed
Bowman take of his

and

it to the woman."

exited his vehicle, told Bowman

was under arrest

was

jacket.

the

allowed to take
who

7

advised the woman she

The woman handed the jacket

searched it and

methamphetamine. kL

The

a pipe,

On appeal, the Court considered whether Bowman was entitled
suppression of the evidence found in his coat. In deciding there was no
Amendment violation, the Court of Appeals first noted "[a] search incident
arrest is a well-established exception to
Idaho at 179, 997 P.2d at 640.

an

warrant requirement." Bowman, 1

The Court also discussed the justifications

underlying the exception and held:
To allow a defendant to hand over an article of clothing just before
his arrest and thereby avoid the search of said item would seriously
undercut the purposes and policy behind the search incident to that
arrest - ensuring the safety of officers and bystanders through the
recovery of weapons within the defendant's area of immediate
control and preventing the loss or destruction of evidence of
criminal activity. Faced with the possibility that the jacket might
contain a weapon or evidence of a crime which could be lost or
destroyed, we conclude that [the officer1 acted reasonably in
requesting the jacket in order to search it incident to Bowman's
arrest. We hold that such search did not violate Bowman's
constitutional rights.
Bowman, 134 Idaho at 180, 997 P.2d at 641 (footnote omitted).
The district court accurately noted the facts of Bowman are "about as
dead on point as we're going to find in a search and seizure case in the state of
Idaho."

(Tr., p.36, Ls.13-16.)

Despite the significant similarities

case and Bowman, Loman argues "Bowman offers little guidance" because it
"was decided prior to Gant." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This argument might have
merit if this case involved a search of an automobile incident to arrest, but
because the coat was not searched as part of the automobile, the timing of the
Bowman decision vis-a-vis Gant is irrelevant.
Loman also argues that Bowman is distinguishable because, he asserts,
unlike in Bowman, "all of the non-police parties involved in the case at hand were

8

was no
remained on
scene

Brief,

was

5.) The

is

lacks

when the coat was ultimately searched

were

distinction

provides no
woman in

handcuffed,

=.:..::..:.::..:.=..:'

officer's

either,

at the time it was

time the search

possession
=~.:..:::;.:.-'.

nCHHIQ

on this basis is unpersuasive.
Bowman

second part of Loman's argument
lacks merit.

concern relating to

It appears Loman misunderstands

a

evidence being lost or destroyed. This
is not intended to protect

incident

suspect from having his drugs

prevent the suspect or, in this case (and in

or destroyed, it is

the suspect's companion
allow individuals

from destroying evidence. The Fourth
avoid a lawful search by thwarting lawful
Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 922, 1

=-"'-'-'-'-'-'-=-'-1'

arrest

P.3d 11

by an officer. See State v.
1161 (2007) (holding that suspect

Loman erroneously asserts the district court made a contrary factual finding on
this point. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This assertion is incorrect. The portion of
the transcript Loman cites for this proposition reveals that the district court merely
made an analogy between the woman who was handed
coat and Bowman
and the access Mason had
the coat when it was lying in the passenger seat.
(Tr., p.39, Ls.16-21.) While Mason was subsequently detained and the coat was
searched after that, he still
access to it when
Loman first threw the coat
inside the car.
2

9

could not thwart a

arrest initiated in a public place by fleeing

home).
if

Arredondo could not remove the coat from

Loman threw it

search it

to arrest, suppression would not

required because a search of the

inside the vehicle would have been proper

following Carlo's positive alert. The
exception to the

exception is a

requirement.

(1980); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho

Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3

, 800, 964 P.2d 660, 667 (1

automobile exception

requirement authorizes a warrantless

of a vehicle

is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains

contraband or

of crimina!

P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct. App.
arose when

11).

152 Idaho 115, 266
Probable cause to search Loman's vehicle

on the passenger door of the car where loman had

been sitting.
App. 2007) ("An

car

1

Idaho 871, 875, 172 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Ct.

by an otherwise reliable, certified drug detection dog is

sufficient to demonstrate

cause to believe contraband is present even if

there exists a possibility that the dog has alerted to residual odors."). Thus, even
if the coat had remained in the car, law enforcement could have searched it
following Carlo's positive alert.
loman correctly notes that the district court rejected the state's argument
the coat could
(Appellant's Brief, pp.1
doing so

been searched pursuant to the automobile exception.
17.) However, a review of the transcript reveals that in
that Loman's act of throwing the coat back in the

10

car was

cause.

conceal it in the car was
encompass the totality
was Carlo's

the circumstances.

district court should
on

considered this factor and

court

correctly

Alternatively, the

search

alternative basis.3
Loman's

district

the car.

which, alone, provided

concluded

arrest,

was
denied

court's ruling may

Loman's
affirmed

on

automobile

exception.

3 The court only considered Carlo's alert in relation to the
the drugs in Loman's coat pocket would have been found pursuant
inevitable discovery doctrine. (Tr., p.28, Ls.4-22; p.4D, L.22 - p.41, L.6.)
court rejected this argument after concluding the state's
only on "suspicion" that had the coat "stayed in the vehicle, the
have
alerted and ultimately would have found the odor on
" (Tr., p.41,
.15.) The evidence introduced at the hearing was that
court's conclusion that
dog would not have alerted
inside
vehicle is what is speculative.

11

state respectfully

30th day

I HEREBY

that I have this 30th day of April, 201
of the attached
OF RESPONDENT by

ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
in
State Appellate
Court Clerk's office.

DER

Defender's basket
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